Blockchain Prediction Markets: Where They Came From, Why They Matter & How to Regulate Those Involved by Dubin, Joshua D.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 97 Issue 2 
2019 
Blockchain Prediction Markets: Where They Came From, Why 
They Matter & How to Regulate Those Involved 
Joshua D. Dubin 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Computer Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua D. Dubin, Blockchain Prediction Markets: Where They Came From, Why They Matter & How to 
Regulate Those Involved, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 575 (2019). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss2/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 












BLOCKCHAIN PREDICTION MARKETS: 
WHERE THEY CAME FROM, WHY THEY 
MATTER & HOW TO REGULATE THOSE 
INVOLVED 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 9, 2018, Judge Brett Kavanaugh was nominated to succeed 
retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy on the United States Supreme Court.1 
After three days of public hearings held in early September,2 Mr. 
Kavanaugh appeared poised for confirmation to the high Court bench. Then, 
in an unpredictable turn of events, reports of an alleged sexual assault 
surfaced,3 prompting the Senate Judiciary Committee to schedule additional 
hearings.4 Political chaos ensued.5 
Between news of the sexual assault allegation on September 16 and the 
decisive confirmation vote on October 5, pundits filled countless columns 
and hours of airtime speculating about the likelihood of Mr. Kavanaugh 
serving as a Supreme Court justice. In spite of this attention, and in part due 
to media polarization,6 people curious about the actual probability of Mr. 
 
1. Sophie Tatum, Brett Kavanaugh’s Nomination: A Timeline, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/inte 
ractive/2018/10/politics/timeline-kavanaugh/ [https://perma.cc/S2V5-XHAZ]. 
2. Hearings were held between September 4 and September 6, 2018 before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. Id.; Nomination of the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018). 
3. Emma Brown, California Professor, Writer of Confidential Brett Kavanaugh Letter, Speaks 




4. Tatum, supra note 1. 
5. See, e.g., Molly Hooper, Corker Predicts Kavanaugh Will Be Confirmed, Says Dems 
‘Overplayed Their Hand,’ HILL (Oct. 2, 2018), https://thehill.com/hilltv/rising/409573-corker-predicts-
gop-has-votes-to-confirm-kavanaugh-slams-dems-as-having [https://perma.cc/R4ME-2HLS]; Elaine 
Kamarck, Will Kavanaugh Be Confirmed? It’s Up to These Five Senators and the FBI, BROOKINGS: 5 
ON 45 (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/will-kavanaugh-be-confirmed-its-u 
p-to-these-five-senators-and-the-fbi/ [https://perma.cc/78UJ-R8W4]; Dylan Scott & Tara Golshan, The 
Senate Bloc that Will Decide Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court Confirmation, VOX (Oct. 5, 2018, 11:25 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/10/3/17933106/brett-kavanaugh-senate-confirmation-v 
ote-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/7B7S-HP39]. 
6. According to a Reuters Institute study, the United States has the most polarized media 
environment of any Western nation. NIC NEWMAN ET AL., REUTER’S INST., REUTERS INSTITUTE 
DIGITAL NEWS REPORT 2017, at 20 (2017), https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Di 
gital%20News%20Report%202017%20web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUA6-FN5T]; see also Brett 
Edkins, Report: U.S. Media Among Most Polarized in The World, FORBES (June 27, 2017, 6:25 AM), ht 
tps://www.forbes.com/sites/brettedkins/2017/06/27/u-s-media-among-most-polarized-in-the-world-stu 
dy-finds/#58978c382546 [https://perma.cc/82P5-SK67]. 












Kavanaugh’s confirmation had few unbiased sources to consider. 
Throughout this time period, there was one venture promising an 
impartial projection of Mr. Kavanaugh’s confirmation odds on a real-time 
basis. PredictIt, a research initiative developed at the Victoria University of 
Wellington,7 hosted a prediction market which financially incentivized 
individuals to correctly guess whether or not Mr. Kavanaugh would be 
confirmed (PredictIt Kavanaugh Market, PKM).8 The PKM served a dual 
purpose as an investing platform and as an information aggregator. Because 
its traders were monetarily motivated to track every twist and turn in the 
weeks leading up to the Senate vote, the PKM provided immediate and 
impartial updates on the likelihood of Mr. Kavanaugh’s confirmation. 
The PKM logged over ten thousand comments in its nineteen-day run,9 
an indication of people’s willingness to participate in a marketplace of ideas. 
As a means of harnessing this marketplace and channeling it towards more 
reliable forecasting, prediction markets have been met with great support 
from economists and private entities.10 However, they have faced equally 
great scrutiny from regulatory agencies.11 
While it is likely that at least a few Kavanaugh confirmation prediction 
markets operated illegally,12 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) addressed the lawfulness of PredictIt’s operation in a no-action 
letter.13 The CFTC recognized that PredictIt’s markets were not contrary to 
American public interest as long as they followed certain guidelines, such 
as limiting the number of traders in any particular contract to 5,000 and 
limiting each trader’s investment to $850 per contract.14 Furthermore, 
PredictIt’s exception was based, in part, “upon the facts that . . . [its] 
proposed market for event contracts ha[d] been designed to serve academic 
purposes and [that] the operators w[ould] receive no compensation.”15 
 
7. What is PredictIt?, PREDICTIT, https://www.predictit.org/support/what-is-predictit [https://p 
erma.cc/AB7N-YXQE]. 




10. Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Promise of Prediction Markets, 320 SCI. 877, 877–78 (2008). 
11. For instance, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission solicited public comment on 
futures markets. Request for Comment: Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of 
Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. 25,669 (May 7, 2008); see infra Section III. 
12. See infra Section III.A. 
13. Neil Quigley, CFTC No-Action Letter, CFTCLTR No. 14-130, 2014 WL 5499971 (Oct. 29, 
2014) [hereinafter Quigley, No-Action]. 
14. Id. 













The basis of CFTC prediction market jurisdiction stems from its 
interpretation of trades in prediction markets as swaps of commodity futures 
and options contracts.16 The CFTC has recognized that prediction markets 
have the capacity to facilitate information discovery and therefore benefit 
the public;17 nevertheless, Commission staff have indicated that these 
public-interest benefits only extend to contracts related to subject matters 
which have generally-accepted and predictable financial, commercial, or 
economic consequences.18 While Supreme Court decisions may prompt 
secondary economic effects, whether or not a particular justice will be 
confirmed would fail the “economic purpose” test that the CFTC has used 
to determine which matters are suitable for futures trading.19 Therefore, 
operation of the PKM was only permissible due to PredictIt’s adherence to 
the CFTC’s no-action terms.20 
Yet, with the development of new technologies, nefarious markets are 
becoming increasingly difficult to regulate.21 Prediction market protocols 
are now hosted on decentralized platforms,22 which facilitate the formation 
of markets that are highly resistant to censorship or third-party 
interference.23 Closely watched by regulators, these decentralized 
prediction markets led one CFTC commissioner to publicly contemplate 
their appropriate regulatory treatment.24 
This Note defends the social value produced by well-regulated prediction 
markets, then offers a novel approach for liability analysis in the context of 
markets formed using blockchain technology. After establishing the 
weaknesses of individual predictions and the benefits that forecasting tools 
can offer, Section I introduces prediction markets and explains how they 
generate valuable information. Section II then describes blockchain 
technology and the properties that make it so effective in the realm of 
prediction markets. Section III focuses on the regulatory environment 
 
16. See infra Section III.A. 
17. Request for Comment: Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event 
Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. 25,669, 25,672 (May 7, 2008). 
18. Id. at 25,671. 
19. Id. at 25,672. 
20. See Quigley, No-Action, supra note 13. 
21. See infra Section III.B. 
22. See infra Section II.C. 
23. Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 487, 550 (2018). 
24. Brian Quintenz, Comm’r, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks at the 38th 
Annual GITEX Technology Week Conference (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Speec 
hesTestimony/opaquintenz16 [https://perma.cc/389N-2V4X]. 












surrounding prediction markets and considers the unique complications 
presented by distributed ledgers. Finally, Section IV depicts frameworks of 
liability analysis developed in intellectual property common law and 
proposes a novel application of these principals as applied to blockchain 
prediction markets. 
I. PREDICTION MARKETS25 
Predicting the future is extremely challenging.26 Economists and social 
scientists readily acknowledge how difficult it is to form reliable forecasts; 
they regularly study why people are flawed at making predictions as well as 
which tools effectively foster improved forecasting.27 One such tool 
promising to improve forecasting accuracy is the prediction market, which 
offers a mechanism to incentivize information gathering and revelation.28 
By harnessing the power of the free market and channeling it towards 
speculation on the outcome of any definable contingency, prediction 
markets provide a valuable prognostic metric: market price.29 
A. “It Is Difficult to Predict, Especially the Future”30 
A prediction is an informed guess or opinion about the future.31 Because 
the future is inherently unknown, predictions embody what an individual or 
entity believes is most likely to occur, based on available information.32 
Predictions are useful for guiding behaviors and expectations in the fields 
 
25. These markets are also commonly referred to as event markets, information markets, decision 
markets, idea markets, and opinion markets. See, e.g., Michael Gorham, Event Markets Campaign for 
Respect, FUTURES INDUSTRY MAG., Jan./Feb. 2004; Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using 
Information Markets to Improve Public Decision Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 213 (2005). 
26. See infra Section I.A. 
27. See infra Sections I.A–B. 
28. See infra Section I.B. 
29. See infra Sections I.C–D. 
30. This quotation has been attributed to Niels Bohr, among others. THE YALE BOOK OF 
QUOTATIONS 92 (Frank Shapiro ed., 2006). 
31. “When it is not clear under which law of nature an effect or a class of effects belongs, we try 
to fill this gap by means of a guess.” HANS CHRISTIAN ØRSTED, SELECTED SCIENTIFIC WORKS OF HANS 
CHRISTIAN ØRSTED 297 (Karen Jelved et al., trans. & eds., 1998). 
32. Armin Grunwald, Modes of Orientation Provided by Futures Studies: Making Sense of 













of science,33 finance,34 politics,35 and more. Unfortunately, inaccurate 
predictions can prove counterproductive. 
Over the past fifty years, volumes of research into heuristics and biases 
have dispelled the notion that people are able to impartially process 
information on a consistent basis.36 For example, when an individual has an 
interest in the result of a given event, optimism bias tends to cause that 
individual to believe that the desired outcome is more likely.37 Due to this 
tendency to inflate the probability of desirable results, the accuracy—and 
forecasting utility—of interested predictions comes into question.38 
Even when an individual is disinterested in a given event, as soon as a 
belief has been formed about what is most likely to occur, the ubiquitous 
confirmation bias hinders consideration of counter-evidence moving 
forward.39 Confirmation bias impacts every species of decision, but its 
implications are particularly well-illustrated in the jury selection process.40 
In selecting jurors from the venire, a lawyer’s goal is to ascertain the jurors’ 
biases, and strike those jurors most obviously prone to drawing premature 
unfavorable conclusions.41 Lawyers are entitled to remove a limited number 
 
33. For example, Galileo’s Equivalence Principle, Newton’s Perihelion Procession of Mercury, 
and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity are all famous predictions. Adam Hadhazy, Putting Relativity to the 
Test, DISCOVER, Apr. 2015, at 30, 30–33. 
34. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Google Search Terms Can Predict Stock Market, Study Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES: BITS BLOG (Apr. 26, 2013, 7:43 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/google-search-
terms-can-predict-stock-market-study-finds/ [https://perma.cc/WC6E-ZX6P]. 
35. See Nate Silver, Even Without InTrade, Billions Will Be Bet on 2016 Race, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:04 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/even-without-intrade-
billions-will-be-bet-on-2016-race/ [https://perma.cc/5BK2-GC4M]. 
36. See Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and 
Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 1, 2–7 (Thomas Gilovich 
et al. eds., 2002). 
37. David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of Unrealistic 
Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 334, 334–47 
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002). 
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s Challenge to 
Habermas) 20–21 (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 321, 2007), https://chicag 
ounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=law_and_economics [https://perm 
a.cc/63M6-LM5S]. 
39. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 
2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 177 (1998) (“[O]nce one has taken a position on an issue, one's primary 
purpose becomes that of defending or justifying that position. This is to say that regardless of whether 
one's treatment of evidence was evenhanded before the stand was taken, it can become highly biased 
afterward.”). 
40. Jurors tend to “look for, or give undo weight to, evidence that supports” their initial 
determination about the proper outcome of a case. Id. at 193–94. 
41. See Robert A. Clifford, How to Pick and Talk to a Jury: Plaintiff Perspective, GPSOLO, 
Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 12, 16, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2014/sept 
ember-october/how_to_pick_and_talk_to_a_jury_plaintiff_perspective/. 












of jurors for no reason at all,42 but have an unlimited number of challenges 
“for cause” to remove jurors for lack of impartiality.43 In allowing unlimited 
strikes for cause, the justice system recognizes that jurors biased from the 
outset will be unable to reach an impartial conclusion based on the evidence 
presented.44 
Outside of the courtroom, confirmation bias may prove particularly 
dangerous in the digital information age. People have more access than ever 
before to wide-ranging and self-serving evidence,45 while also exhibiting 
strong tendencies to treat that evidence selectively.46 Though conflicting 
viewpoints tend not to be avoided entirely, far more time is spent 
considering attitude-consistent messages, particularly when the topic is 
deemed highly important.47 Because these biases skew our ability to make 
predictions and these flawed predictions drive decision-making, society 
would benefit from a more reliable, accountable, and accurate forecasting 
device. One tool worthy of consideration is the prediction market. 
B. Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is, for the Good of Society: An 
Introduction to Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets involve collections of people speculating on the 
outcome of a future event.48 These markets allow participants to trade 
contracts that are similar to event derivatives, where the contract price 
 
42. Importantly, these peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on 
their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
43. Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge for Cause Against Peremptory Challenges 
in Criminal Proceedings, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 507, 507–08 (1997). 
44. See Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 152 (2010). However, judges and attorneys are as susceptible to implicit 
biases as anyone else. Id. at 158. 
45. Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia & Filippo Menczer, Biases Make People Vulnerable to 
Misinformation Spread by Social Media, SCI. AM.: THE CONVERSATION (June 21, 2018), https://www.sc 
ientificamerican.com/article/biases-make-people-vulnerable-to-misinformation-spread-by-social-medi 
a/ [https://perma.cc/WYW9-S2PN]. 
46. Nickerson, supra note 39, at 175. Even Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos has said that 
“the Internet in its current incarnation is a confirmation bias machine.” Nick Bastone, Jeff Bezos: 
Today’s Internet Is a ‘Confirmation Bias Machine’ That Could Help Autocratic Regimes, BUS. INSIDER 
(Oct. 15, 2018, 7:41 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-internet-confirmation-bias-mach 
ine-help-autocratic-regimes-2018-10 [https://perma.cc/3Y2R-V4VZ]. 
47. Silvia Knobloch-Westerwick et al., Confirmation Bias in Online Searches: Impacts of 
Selective Exposure Before an Election on Political Attitude Strength and Shifts, 20 J. COMPUTER-
MEDIATED COMM. 171, 181 (2014). 














reflects the probability of a specified result.49 Though prediction market 
prices are subject to certain biases,50 “the potential for profit (and loss) 
creates strong incentives to search for better information” and prediction 
markets have a demonstrated record of successful use.51 The range of 
applications is vast, including political events, financial events, science and 
technology events, and more.52  
To demonstrate the mechanics of a political prediction market, imagine 
a contract that specifies that President Trump will be reelected in 2020; this 
hypothetical contract pays out one-hundred dollars post-election if 
President Trump wins and zero dollars if he does not (the “Trump2020” 
contract).53 If the last Trump2020 trade was for forty dollars, the implied 
market odds of President Trump’s reelection are 40 percent.54 Similar 
contracts can be formed in order to determine each Democratic candidate’s 
likelihood of earning the Democratic Party nomination. 
Leading up to November 3, 2020, those interested in a market-based 
measure of the likelihood of President Trump’s reelection could monitor the 
price of the Trump2020 contract.55 This information is valuable because the 
accuracy of market-based predictions often surpasses other forms of 
forecasting.56 Prediction markets are particularly well-suited forecasting 
aids due to three chief benefits that they provide. First, they incentivize the 
gathering of accurate information.57 Next, they incentivize the truthful 
revelation of that information.58 Finally, they offer “an algorithm for 
aggregating diverse opinions.”59 
 
49. Lukas Schor, Explained: Prediction Markets, MEDIUM (June 20, 2018), https://medium.com/ 
@argongroup/decentralized-prediction-markets-explained-d9f0425d331c [https://perma.cc/F9JB-XEZ 
X]. 
50. Arrow et al., supra note 10, at 877. 
51. Id. 
52. See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 48, at 110–11 (listing examples of prediction markets). 
53. See Adam Ozimek, The Regulation and Value of Prediction Markets 3 (Mercatus Ctr., 
George Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 14-07, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Ozimek 
_PredictionMarkets_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7QW-GUXS] (providing a similar example, but with the 
2012 election). Conversely, one can imagine (or observe) a contract that specifies that President Trump 
will be impeached in his first term. Will Donald Trump Be Impeached in His First Term?, PREDICTIT, 
https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/3537/Will-Donald-Trump-be-impeached-in-his-first-term [htt 
ps://perma.cc/JU6A-WZVL]. 
54. Ozimek, supra note 53, at 3.  
55. Id. The price will react and respond to available information, reflecting the perceived future 
value of the contract, akin to a traditional securities instrument. Id. at 4–6. 
56. See infra Section I.C. 
57. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 48, at 125. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 












In the reelection example, statisticians and forecasters have a profit 
motive to search for better information, and improve upon modeling 
techniques, in order to come up with more accurate forecasts of the 
likelihood of President Trump’s reelection. If an entity has reason to believe 
that the price of the Trump2020 contract does not reflect the true likelihood 
of reelection, this information will be revealed either through the purchase 
or sale of shares. Assuming that the Trump2020 market attracts sufficient 
trading volume and liquidity, its price is a single, observable metric useful 
for estimating reelection probability.60 
The effectiveness of any given prediction market to accomplish the three 
benefits mentioned above is not free from debate.61 Notably, in an arena 
such as political elections, many public and private entities are motivated to 
generate accurate predictions; this makes it less likely that the existence of 
a prediction market will incentivize expenditures of additional time or 
resources to produce revelatory information.62 Further, prediction markets 
hold less value in instances where the relevant information is held by a few 
informed parties, rather than being dispersed.63 Nonetheless, prediction 
markets generate a unique information set capable of improving traditional 
forecasting methods,64 and because they allow shrewd investors to profit 
from the mistakes of lesser informed individuals, prediction markets “tend 
to correct rather than amplify individual errors.”65 
 
60. Id. at 124. 
61. See, e.g., Lionel Page & Robert T. Clemen, Do Prediction Markets Produce Well-Calibrated 
Probability Forecasts?, 123 ECON. J. 491, 510–12 (2013). 
62. There are a number of publicly available models designed to aid in election forecasting. See, 
e.g., D.R., Introducing Our Prediction Model for America’s Mid-Term Elections, ECONOMIST (May 24, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/05/24/introducing-our-prediction-model-for-a 
mericas-mid-term-elections [https://perma.cc/5ULV-SPE8]; Nate Silver, How FiveThirtyEight’s House 
Model Works, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 16, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features /2018-
house-forecast-methodology/ [https://perma.cc/Y2UR-PLQA]. However, these tools are far less 
common in other fields. See also infra Section II.D. 
63. Sunstein, supra note 38, at 24 (describing “two conspicuous failures” where prediction 
“markets found it more probable than not that Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald would indict White 
House adviser Karl Rove in 2005, and they found it exceedingly improbable that President George W. 
Bush would appoint John Roberts to the United States Supreme Court.” In these instances, “[t]he best 
explanation is that there was not a great deal of dispersed information about the particular decisions . . . . 
[I]nvestors . . . lacked the kind of information that would permit successful judgments.”). 
64. David Rothschild, Combining Forecasts for Elections: Accurate, Relevant, and Timely, 31 
INT’L J. FORECASTING 952, 953–55 (2015). 













C. The Economic Rationale Supporting Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets facilitate the distillation of information into an 
illuminating metric: market price.66 In many situations, information is 
dispersed among diverse actors; consequently, it is desirable to find a 
mechanism to collect and aggregate this scattered knowledge.67 Though 
polls are revealing when scientifically conducted,68 free markets can 
efficiently accomplish the same objective by providing a profit-motive to 
stimulate the search for information.69 
In an efficient prediction market,70 the contract price will be the single 
best indicator of the likelihood of that event.71 No combination of available 
polls or other public information can improve on the market-generated 
forecasts, because the price incorporates and reflects all of that 
information.72 In reality, prediction markets need not and will not be 
perfectly efficient.73 Nevertheless, prediction market prices have proven 
revelatory when the following conditions are met: the tradeable contract is 
drafted with sufficient specification; the market contains effective matching 
mechanisms to pair sellers with buyers; the market attracts participants 
drawing upon diverse information; and these participants possess ample 
motivation to actively participate in the market.74 
 
66. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945) (“[I]n a 
system where the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people,” prices act as a 
mechanism of communicating information). 
67. Id. 
68. Scientific polling is expensive, and someone must foot the bill. For a list of questions useful 
in helping determine poll validity, see Sheldon R. Gawiser & G. Evans Witt, 20 Questions a Journalist 
Should Ask About Poll Results, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PUB. POLLS, http://www.ncpp.org/files/20%20Quest 
ions%203rd%20edition_Web%20ver_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5NY-E7UD]. 
69. Arrow, supra note 10, at 877. 
70. “A market is efficient with respect to information set θt if it is impossible to make economic 
profits by trading on the basis of information set θt.” Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence 
Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 96 (1978). Note, the market need not (and cannot) be 
perfectly efficient. For an in-depth analysis of the efficient market hypothesis, see generally Burton G. 
Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 59. 
71. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 48, at 108. 
72. Id. Note, the perfect efficiency of markets is not a prerequisite for their price to aggregate 
and reveal information. Hayek, supra note 66, at 12. 
73. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 404 (1980). 
74. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 48, at 121. 












D. Prediction Markets in Action 
When it comes to events subject to less public attention than national 
elections, and outcomes unrelated to public sentiment, prediction markets 
can be of particular value to journalists and reporters.75 For a diverse set of 
questions, such as whether and when the Higgs boson particle would be 
discovered,76 where Lebron James would sign in free agency,77 and whether 
Congress would pass the Affordable Healthcare Act,78 New York Times 
columnists and reporters cited prediction markets, particularly InTrade, as 
reliable sources of forecasting information.79 
No longer confined to economists’ toolbelts, prediction markets have 
become an increasingly popular topic of discussion and application in the 
legal field as well.80 FantasySCOTUS is the leading Supreme Court 
prediction market operator and has enabled tens of thousands of lawyers, 
academics, law students, and members of the public to make predictions 
about case outcomes.81 FantasySCOTUS’ operational mission is to utilize 
experts, crowds, and algorithms to generate accurate Supreme Court case 
forecasts.82 
Supreme Court verdicts often carry economic implications,83 and 
 
75. Ozimek, supra note 53, at 12–13. 
76. See, e.g., Dennis Overbye, New Data on Elusive Particle Shrouded in Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/science/new-data-on-higgs-boson-is-shrouded-i 
n-secrecy-at-cern.html [https://perma.cc/G2QM-DSVR]. 
77. See, e.g., J. David Goodman, King James and Other Small Things, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM 
(July 8, 2010, 11:07 AM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/king-james-and-other-small-
things/ [https://perma.cc/4FEC-ZQX3]. 
78. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Health Care Resurrection, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A 
LIBERAL (Mar. 9, 2010, 9:46 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/health-care-resurrec 
tion/ [https://perma.cc/MJG5-ZACE]. 
79. Ozimek, supra note 53, at 12. 
80. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2007) (prediction market for corporate governance); 
Josh Blackman et al., FantasySCOTUS Crowdsourcing a Prediction Market for the Supreme Court, 10 
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 125, 152 (2012) (prediction market for Supreme Court appointments); 
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 15 (2010) 
(prediction market for crime rate). 
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prediction markets related to case outcomes represent just one of the many 
ways in which private entities can utilize prediction market prices. In the 
technology sector, prediction markets were able to forecast Google’s initial 
public offering price better than Google had with internal auction 
mechanisms that it had designed to “avoid . . . underpricing.”84 In the health 
field, prediction markets have provided prognoses of seasonal influenza 
activity two to four weeks in advance of historically-based forecasts85 and 
have accurately predicted the spread of dengue fever outbreaks.86 Perhaps 
most strikingly, prediction markets tied to macroeconomic indicator data 
releases outperformed surveys of professional analysts, as the markets were 
better able to estimate payrolls, unemployment claims, retail sales, business 
confidence, and other measures of macroeconomic performance.87 The 
breadth and success of private prediction markets indicates that they have 
utility,88 but their operation creates logistical and regulatory concerns.  
II. DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS AND DECENTRALIZED PREDICTION MARKETS 
Prediction markets have historically been operated in a centralized 
fashion.89 This is because the most straightforward method of trade 
aggregation “is for a trustworthy entity to maintain a ledger.”90 Centralized 
 
Decision-Making (May 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript at 12), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
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44 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 272, 277–78 (2007). 
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CLINICIANS’ BIOSECURITY NEWS (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/resources/cbn 
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markets also require an “impartial, trusted judge to determine the outcome” 
and then “distribute payouts to traders.”91 Critically, these centralized 
markets are subject to severe regulatory scrutiny.92 
Blockchain technology, also known as Distributed Ledger Technology 
(DLT), offers an alternative to centralization and enables people, for the first 
time, to maintain digital trust without the use of an intermediary.93 By 
combining prediction markets with DLT, developers now have the tools to 
efficiently and effectively unleash the wisdom of the crowds.94 DLT 
prediction markets date back to 2014, and as of 2019 there are working 
prototypes available to the public.95 
A. An Introduction to DLT 
Over the past decade, DLT has married traditional record-keeping 
methods with technological advances to create a new system for preserving 
and sharing data.96 In the not-so-distant past, it was impossible for users to 
agree that a digital transaction was valid without a trusted, centralized 
authority performing verification.97 Today, DLT enables crowdsourced 
verification and empowers separate parties to independently form a 
consensus regarding transaction validity.98 
DLT facilitates transactions through three fundamental features: (1) 
“decentralized consensus mechanisms,” (2) “distributed data storage,” and 
(3) “cryptographic algorithms.”99 Decentralized consensus describes the 
principles and techniques through which participants on a distributed 
network come to an agreement on the validity of the transactions on their 
shared database. Because consensus can be reached in a decentralized 
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manner, no single entity is required to confirm a transaction’s validity.100 
Similarly, by distributing data storage, the need for a single recordkeeper is 
obviated. Instead, each member of the network retains a complete record of 
transactions, and cryptographic algorithms ensure the integrity of these 
records.101 
These unique attributes allow market formation to occur in a public, 
permanent, and trustless manner.102 Because the underlying ledger is 
“maintained by no one and available to everyone,”103 the information stored 
in a decentralized ledger is resistant to fraud or error.104 These properties 
also ensure that DLT-published code cannot be retroactively tampered with, 
even by its creator. 
B. The Theoretical Promise of DLT Prediction Markets 
Before the advent of DLT, it was challenging to create accessible 
prediction markets.105 Centralized market formation is limited by high 
startup costs and no guarantee of liquidity.106 Now, using programmable 
smart contracts,107 “[a]nyone can create a market based on any real-world 
event”108 and “parties can confirm that an event or condition has in fact 
occurred without the need for a third party.”109 
To demonstrate, a functional DLT prediction market protocol operates 
as follows. First, “[t]he market creator sets the event end time and chooses 
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a designated reporter to report the outcome of the event.”110 Then, 
“[m]arket participants forecast the outcomes of events by trading shares of 
those market outcomes.”111 Finally, “[o]utcomes are determined by [an] 
oracle, which consists of profit-motivated reporters, who simply report the 
actual, real-world outcome of the event.”112 This model appears uniquely 
well-situated to keep up with the “constant small changes which make up 
the whole economic picture.”113 In theory, the ability to fund—and profit 
from—wide-ranging prediction markets provides people across the world 
with an incentive to seek and sort information, capitalize on price 
inefficiencies, and disclose privately held knowledge. 
C. Augur: A Blockchain Prediction Market Protocol in Action 
While numerous DLT prediction markets are in development,114 Augur 
was a pioneer on the DLT prediction market front.115 Conceived in 2014, 
Augur raised over five million dollars of working capital the next year.116 
That money was used to fund the Forecast Foundation (FF), a non-profit 
entity comprised of “developers and technology professionals who . . . 
support[ ] and develop[ ] the free, open-source protocol that is Augur.”117 
Augur is not a prediction market itself; rather, it enables users to create their 
own market or trade on markets created by others.118 
It is helpful to conceptualize Augur as comprising two separate 
dimensions: a user-facing application and a set of DLT contracts.119 The 
user-facing application consists of a “website with no affiliation, support, 
or relationship to the Forecast Foundation.”120 The FF is exclusively 
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concerned with developing Augur as a protocol;121 in other words, it is 
focused on supporting the DLT contracts so that people can create and 
engage with markets. Because the FF does not profit from use of the Augur 
application, it has no incentive to invest on improving Augur’s user 
experience (UX). Therefore, while the smart contracts driving Augur are 
impressive, its interface can be onerous.122 
In October 2019, over 2,700 markets were active on the Augur platform 
with over three million dollars at stake,123 though only twenty-one of those 
markets were liquid.124 While approximately one hundred and thirty 
thousand dollars has been transacted, to date, in the market “Will Donald 
Trump be Re-Elected in 2020?,”125 the vast majority of markets have 
attracted no trading at all.126  
In order to address Augur’s UX deficiency, the startup Veil built a 
platform designed to streamline interaction with the Augur protocol.127 
While similar to the FF in many regards, Veil assumed an active role in 
limiting which traders were allowed on its platform and restricting the 
markets that they were able to create.128 Veil’s UX improvements to the 
Augur protocol were motivated by a 1 percent fee which it charged on all 
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orders;129 however, Veil ceased operations shortly after its launch.130 
Proffering a reason as to why Veil failed, its co-founder and CEO asserted: 
“We weren’t decentralized or regulated. Some users want a fully 
decentralized, unstoppable product and others want a regulated product. It’s 
hard to offer something in between that people find valuable.”131 
In contrast to Veil, the FF has no operational role in the markets created 
on Augur, cannot access the funds that are held in escrow, “does not control 
how markets resolve or are created, does not approve or reject trades or 
other transactions on the network, and do[es] not have the ability to modify, 
cancel, undo, or interact with orders on the network.”132 In essence, the FF 
has published a decentralized protocol that places full control in the hands 
of the users.133 
III. PREDICTION MARKET REGULATORY PARADIGMS 
While DLT prediction markets present a slew of new regulatory 
challenges, the CFTC has made it clear that it intends to regulate these 
markets to the full extent of its authority.134 As the principal agency tasked 
with regulating commodity futures and options, the CFTC relies on a 
sweeping definition of “commodity,” which includes all goods, articles, 
services, rights, and interests which are or may be the subject of futures 
contracts.135 Under congressional authority,136 the CFTC takes regulatory 
purview over entities operating prediction markets.137 Over the years, no-
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action letters transitioned to million-dollar penalties, as the CFTC’s 
tolerance for prediction markets steadily waned. 
A. The CFTC’s Historical Approach Towards Regulating Prediction 
Markets 
Prediction markets have a rich history in the United States, with large, 
centralized entities organizing political speculation markets between 1868 
and 1940.138 Though public interest dwindled through the middle of the 
twentieth century, by 1990, an operation at the University of Iowa had 
established markets on elections for educational and research purposes 
(Iowa Electronic Markets, IEM).139 It was these markets that caught the 
attention of the CFTC and led to a series of actions demonstrating 
progressively tighter regulations. 
The CFTC’s first two letters pertaining to prediction markets, issued in 
1992 and 1993,140 promulgated three primary policies: (1) “nonpolitical 
markets [were] only open to ‘academic traders,’” (2) the “maximum 
investment” per individual was limited to five hundred dollars and markets 
were “limited to 1,000–2,000 traders,” and (3) the CFTC’s nonaction was 
premised on “IEM’s academic purpose and nonprofit operation.”141 These 
nonaction letters signaled that the CFTC’s chief concern was limiting 
market size, and small-scale prediction markets proliferated.142 
By 2005, the CFTC indicated increased interest in inhibiting prediction 
market activity and announced that it had reached a settlement with the 
Trade Exchange Network (TEN), directing TEN to pay $150,000 for 
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offering commodity option contracts.143 The CFTC found that TEN 
solicited U.S. customers to trade in markets for gold prices, crude oil prices, 
the intraday Euro versus U.S. Dollar rate, and the U.S. Dollar versus Yen 
cash rate.144 Because these markets were not excepted or exempted from the 
Commission’s regulation banning options trading, TEN was found in 
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).145 In spite of these 
penalties, sustained interest in prediction markets during the 2008 election 
led the CFTC to solicit comment on appropriate regulatory treatment.146 
These comments were reflected in the CFTC’s next prediction market-
related action in 2010, which approved two markets for box-office 
futures.147 Regrettably for cinephiles, this Hollywood-centric carve-out was 
short-lived—the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 amended the CEA “to explicitly define box-office revenues as 
not a commodity, and thereby effectively banned box-office futures.”148  
Furthermore, the 2010 legislation amended the CEA to prohibit the 
trading of any contract which is “contrary to the public interest,” defined as 
including: “(I) activity that is unlawful under any Federal or State law; (II) 
terrorism; (III) assassination; (IV) war; (V) gaming; or (VI) other similar 
activity determined by the Commission, by rule or regulation, to be contrary 
to the public interest.”149 This legislation encouraged heightened CFTC 
enforcement,150 and no case better illustrates the CFTC’s post-Dodd-Frank 
prediction market crackdown than that of InTrade.151 
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Founded in Ireland in 2001, and acquired by TEN in 2003, InTrade 
earned a reputation as the world’s leading prediction market during the 2008 
and 2012 U.S. elections.152 By November 2012, InTrade was generating 
fifty million monthly page views.153 This success proved to be for naught, 
because according to the CFTC, InTrade’s operations were in violation of 
the 2005 cease and desist order issued to TEN.154 In this 2005 order, TEN—
and by extension InTrade—agreed to cease soliciting and accepting orders 
from U.S. customers for the trading of options not excepted or exempted 
from the CFTC’s ban on off-exchange trading.155 
In November 2012, the CFTC charged InTrade for multiple violations 
stemming from its operation of prediction markets.156 A few months later, 
InTrade shut down,157 and six years after the charges were initially filed, 
InTrade and TEN were required to pay a three million dollar civil monetary 
penalty for these violations of the CEA and CFTC Regulations.158 This case 
demonstrates the harsh consequences of operating a centralized prediction 
market in America, or soliciting American users, in light of the regulatory 
shift “from uncertainty and legal gray areas to gradually more restrictive 
laws and enforcement.”159 
B. A Commissioner’s Perspective on DLT Prediction Markets 
The CEA,160 which statutorily grounds the CFTC’s actions, was drafted 
in an environment in which known “swap dealers, futures commission 
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merchants, clearinghouses, and fund managers” all participated in a 
centralized exchange.161 This framework was not designed in reaction to, or 
in anticipation of, “the disintermediated world of blockchain.”162 However, 
the dissemination of increasingly complex technology creates both a need 
and an opportunity for the CFTC to revisit its policies.163  
On October 16, 2018, CFTC Commissioner Brian Quintenz expressed 
his view on the CFTC’s role in regulating DLT prediction markets.164 
Commissioner Quintenz pointed out that event contracts have a unique spot 
in CFTC jurisprudence.165 Specifically, Commissioner Quintenz called 
attention to the public policy concerns that certain event contracts can raise. 
The Commissioner noted that the CFTC has historically “only permitt[ed] 
them in limited circumstances when it has found that they operate on a 
small-scale, non-profit basis, and serve academic purposes.”166  
If DLT prediction market contracts resemble traditional prediction 
market event contracts, then they likely fall under the general prohibition of 
being contrary to the public interest, unless they are subject to the IEM and 
PredictIt exceptions.167 Speaking in hypothetical language, Commissioner 
Quintenz considered “event contracts, executed in a potentially for-profit 
manner, between retail customers, on any conceivable event, for any sum 
of money,” and concluded that these types of contracts would raise 
numerous CFTC regulatory concerns.168 Regardless of whether a contract is 
formed with DLT, if the contract is a product within the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction, then it is subject to CFTC enforcement.169 Given the recent 
penalty imposed against InTrade and TEN,170 this reality may prove 
troublesome for the creators of blockchain prediction markets. 
 
161. Quintenz, supra note 24. 
162. Id. 
163. See Brian Tamanaha, Law’s Evolving Emergent Phenomena: From Rules of Social 
Intercourse to Rule of Law Society, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2018) (“Social, economic, 
technological, and political life are increasingly complex, and law is correspondingly complex as it 
struggles to keep up with surrounding technical complexities that legal officials themselves sometimes 
have difficulty comprehending.”). 



















C. Conflict Brewing Between the Forecast Foundation and the CFTC 
Due to the tamper-proof nature of blockchain code,171 the FF “has no 
power to censor, restrict, or curate markets, orders, trades, positions or 
resolutions on the Augur protocol contracts.”172 The FF has therefore taken 
the stance that where a market contravenes law or regulation, liability falls 
on the market-maker, as opposed to the developers of the code that enables 
creation of the market.173 
This theory remains largely untested, and though the Augur website 
contains multiple liability disclaimers and encourages users to follow local 
laws and regulations,174 it remains unclear how the CFTC will pursue 
enforcement against DLT prediction market participants generally, and the 
FF specifically. In his October address, Commissioner Quintenz posed the 
pertinent, perhaps rhetorical, question: “[W]ho should be held accountable 
for this activity?”175 Interestingly, “[w]ill the Forecast Foundation face an 
enforcement action from the SEC or CFTC before Dec[ember] 21, 2018 for 
hosting unregulated derivatives markets?” is one of the thousands of 
prediction markets created so far via the Augur code.176 
IV. A PROPOSAL ON PREDICTION MARKET REGULATION IN THE 
BLOCKCHAIN ERA 
Commissioner Quintenz recognized that, when considering enforcement 
against DLT prediction market participants, two potentially liable groups 
 
171. Kiviat, supra note 96, at 577 n.46. (“[T]ransactions on the blockchain are essentially 
accounting entries that are cryptographically sealed, preventing tampering and enabling near-real-time 
auditing.”). 
172. FAQs, supra note 117. The FF further claims to “encourage users to follow their respective 
local jurisdictional laws, rules and regulations, even though it can’t and doesn’t control their use of the 
Augur protocol.” Id. 
173. Id. (“Users of the Augur protocol must themselves ensure that the actions they are performing 
are compliant with the laws in all applicable jurisdictions and must acknowledge that others’ use of the 
Augur protocol may not be compliant. Users of the Augur protocol do so at their own risk.”). 
174. Id. 
175. Quintenz, supra note 24. 
176. Will the Forecast Foundation Face an Enforcement Action from the SEC or CFTC Before 
Dec. 21, 2018 for Hosting Unregulated Derivatives Markets?, PREDICTIONS.GLOBAL (July 19, 2018), ht 
tps://predictions.global/augur-markets/will-the-forecast-foundation-face-an-enforcement-action-from-t 
he-sec-or-cftc-before-dec-21-2018-for-hosting-unregulated-0xa5706d1d3da0f9c0878a457132296ea9d 
cd2ce65. The market opened on July 19, 2018, indicating a 65 percent likelihood of enforcement. 
Ultimately, no traders participated in the market before its close. Id. There has been no public 
enforcement action at this point, however, it is clear that DLT prediction markets are in the CFTC’s 
crosshairs. See supra Section III.B. 












are the developers of the code underlying the event contracts and the 
individual users of that code who create or trade in the markets.177 As 
discussed, some code developers have asserted that because they merely 
created the protocol and have no control over user behavior, they therefore 
assume no liability.178 Nevertheless, existing legal theories in the realm of 
intellectual property can offer guidance.  
Specifically, the theory of secondary liability found in patent law,179 as 
well as in copyright cases,180 provides a useful framework through which to 
analyze liability in the DLT prediction market landscape. Because the 
threshold requirement for secondary liability and contributory infringement 
is the existence of direct liability or direct infringement,181 the analysis must 
begin by considering what categories of prediction markets are or should be 
banned. 
A. Examining Categories of Disallowed Markets 
Reforms ushered in with Dodd-Frank prohibit the listing, trading, or 
clearing of a product that is based on certain excluded commodities and that 
involves terrorism, war, assassination, gaming, activity that is unlawful 
under any state or federal law, or a product determined to be contrary to the 
public interest.182 Ostensibly, each of the above categories represents 
subject matter that Congress prefers for people to refrain from speculating 
upon; however, in some instances, these policies are misguided. 
This Note contends that Congress should amend the CEA to strike the 
blanket prohibitions against markets related to terrorism, war, and gaming. 
Further, due to the economic value of the information produced by wide-
ranging prediction markets, the CFTC should use its discretion to deem the 
vast majority of markets permissible under the public interest test. 
 
177. Quintenz, supra note 24. 
178. Id.; see also FAQs, supra note 117. 
179. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States 
or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or 
composition, or a material or an apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material 
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”). 
180. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
181. Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972) (“[T]here can be no 
contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a direct infringement.”). 













1. Terrorism and War 
In 2001, the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) 
began experimenting with methods for applying prediction market insights 
to intelligence operations.183 In July 2003, it was revealed that DARPA 
allowed trading in various forms of geopolitical risk, including economic 
and military scenarios.184 News of this program was met with a public 
outcry, and critics attacked DARPA for dealing in “terrorism futures.”185 
Instead of spending political capital defending a small operation, DARPA 
dropped the proposal.186 
Congressional outrage against “terrorism futures” seems to have been 
entirely misplaced, as, rather than encouraging terrorism, it is likely that 
DARPA’s prediction markets could have contributed to tactical initiatives 
undertaken by the U.S. Intelligence Community.187 Concerns of market 
manipulation—the fear that terrorists could influence the market to mislead 
the intelligence community or potentially even use the market to finance 
attacks188—are not supported by the data.189 Instead, prediction markets can 
supply useful estimates of tactical trends and threats, and contribute to cost-
benefit assessments of ongoing or proposed policies.190 
Terrorism and war deal with similar moral concerns; however, 
outbreaks of war raise an entirely unique set of economic questions.191 
Because the prospect of armed conflict has serious repercussions on 
financial sectors, more accurately tracking the shifting probability of 
entering a war—and creating hedging opportunities—is a valuable 
service.192 
 
183. Puong Fei Yeh, Using Prediction Markets to Enhance US Intelligence Capabilities: A 
“Standard & Poors 500 Index” for Intelligence, STUD. INTELLIGENCE, Number 4, 2006, at 37. 
184. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 48, at 107–08. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Yeh, supra note 183, at 49. 
188. Id. 
189. Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market Accuracy, 76 
ECONOMICA 304, 312–13 (2009). 
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191. See Andrew Leigh et al., What Do Financial Markets Think of War in Iraq? 1–37 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9587, 2003), https://www.nber.org/papers/w9587.pdf [ht 
tps://perma.cc/778M-DQKH]; Reuven Glick & Alan M. Taylor, Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption 
and the Economic Impact of War 1–56 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11565, 
2005), https://www.nber.org/papers/w11565.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAL9-WHQK]. 
192. Leigh et al., supra note 191, at 33–34. Using U.S. involvement in Iraq as a case study, 












Establishing a prediction market tied to the outbreak of military activity 
does not consider the humanitarian costs of the speculated-upon event; it is 
also unlikely to impact the behavior of those in charge of military 
decisions.193 Instead, war-based prediction markets may create a useful 
indicator for policy makers and corporate executives to consider in the 
macroeconomic context.194 Given the sensitive nature of war- and terrorism-
based markets, they undoubtedly warrant closer monitoring than most; 
nevertheless, a categorical ban on these classes of prediction markets will 
deprive U.S. actors of a telling economic barometer.195 
2. Gaming 
The CEA specifically preempts the application of any state or local law 
which prohibits or regulates gaming in the case of an agreement, contract, 
or transaction that falls under the public interest exemption provisions.196 
However, the CEA also states that it is not intended to supersede or preempt 
prosecution under any federal criminal statute.197 Therefore, “while state 
law is preempted when the CFTC . . . determines a particular type of 
transaction is exempt from CEA, federal prohibitions against gaming, such 
as in the Federal Wire Act, are not.”198 In short, enforcing an embargo 
against gaming contracts falls to the Department of Justice (DOJ), not the 
 
economists found that macroeconomic effects of the conflict “could arise from short-term oil price 
shocks, from the effects of deficit-financed military spending, or from effects on consumer confidence 
in and investor expectations about the future.” Id. at 5. 
193. Id. at 37. While prediction markets could “conceivably be used to inform decision-making 
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of market expectations,” this level of influence is unanticipated even by the most ardent prediction 
market proponents. Id. at 2 & n.2. 
194. Id. at 36–37. One study found that “war lowers the value of U.S. equities by around 15 
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war bolsters the gold and energy sectors.” Id. at abstract. 
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Gaming regulation has seen both permissive and restrictive 
developments since the start of 2018. On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court 
held that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
(PASPA)199 violated the Tenth Amendment and declared PASPA 
unconstitutional.200 Within a month, Delaware became the first state outside 
of Nevada to legalize sports gambling;201 as of this writing, seven states 
have permitted state-regulated betting industries and legislation is under 
review in nineteen more.202 On the other hand, on January 15, 2019, the DOJ 
released an opinion that asserted that the Wire Act encompasses all forms 
of gambling that cross state boundaries.203  
In reversing the department’s previous policy that communications 
unrelated to a “sporting event or contest” fell outside of the Wire Act’s 
reach,204 the latest DOJ opinion indicates that it may pursue any type of 
interstate gambling or wagering activity.205 The recency of this opinion 
makes it impossible to evaluate how enforcement will respond; however, in 
light of the demonstrated interest in over half of the states to establish 
regulated gaming markets,206 these markets should be suppressed only to 
the extent that they contravene public interest.207 
 
199. This act effectively outlawed sports betting nationwide. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012). 
200. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). While the decision only 
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Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2018)); see also Michael 
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3. Contrary to Public Interest 
“Contrary to the public interest,” as defined in the CEA, encompasses 
the enumerated categories discussed above, as well as “other similar activity 
determined by the Commission, by rule or regulation.”208 This rulemaking 
process calls for “public notice and opportunity for a hearing on the 
record.”209 Because there is no fixed statutory definition, the agency must 
exercise discretion in its promulgation of public interest rules. 
The CFTC is generally directed to consider the costs and benefits of all 
proposed regulations, paying closest attention to: (1) “[p]rotection of market 
participants and the public;” (2) “efficiency, competitiveness and financial 
integrity of futures markets;” (3) “price discovery;” and (4) “sound risk 
management practices.”210 In a 2008 solicitation for comment on the 
appropriate regulatory treatment of prediction markets, the CFTC 
recognized that “innovative event markets have the capacity to facilitate the 
discovery of information, and thereby provide potential benefits to the 
public.”211 
Nevertheless, a few years after this acknowledgement, the CFTC 
prohibited the listing or trading of political event contracts on the North 
American Derivatives Exchange.212 In its Order, the CFTC asserted that 
political futures had no hedging or price discovery purpose due to the 
“unpredictability of the specific economic consequences of an election;”213 
therefore, these markets were deemed contrary to the public interest. 214 The 
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Commission further contended that political prediction markets 
contravened public interest because they “can potentially be used in ways 
that would have an adverse effect on the integrity of elections, for example 
by creating monetary incentives to vote for particular candidates even when 
such a vote may be contrary to the voter’s political views of such 
candidates.”215 
This CFTC analysis and reasoning misses the mark on prediction 
markets by discounting the informational value generated by the market 
price and overestimating the behavioral impact of market formation.216 As 
nineteen leading academics studying prediction markets argued in a joint 
statement, political prediction markets have real potential to serve a 
meaningful hedging function,217 but the regulatory environment is operating 
as a major impediment preventing that reality.218 Though it is sensible to 
prohibit the formation of markets contrary to the public interest, the public 
interest is likely best served through a laissez-faire approach to prediction 
market regulation. 
B. Determining Who Is Liable for the Propagation of Banned Markets 
Once it is established which particular markets deserve the bulk of CFTC 
regulatory attention, the decentralized environment of DLT prediction 
markets present novel enforcement challenges.219 Considering whether code 
developers can absolve themselves of liability by eschewing a participatory 
role in the markets, Commissioner Quintenz claimed that the “appropriate 
question is whether these code developers could reasonably foresee, at the 
time they created the code, that it would likely be used by U.S. persons in a 
manner violative of CFTC regulations.”220 This “likelihood of infringing 
use” test is worth consideration, but the realm of intellectual property law 
provides multiple frameworks that may be tailored to the DLT prediction 
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market context in accordance with the level of operational control and 
interest assumed by code developers. 
1. Secondary Liability as Considered in Patent and Copyright Law 
Because the developers of DLT prediction market protocols do not 
necessarily play an active role in the operation of markets using their 
code,221 these developers can avoid allegations of a direct violation of the 
CEA. However, it may still be reasonable to find developers secondarily 
liable for the improper acts of others, depending on the intention for, and 
benefit obtained from, the code’s publication and use. Practical frameworks 
for liability can be derived from patent and copyright law. 
In patent law, the selling of a device that enables the purchaser’s 
infringement of a patent is prohibited when the contributory infringer knew 
of the patent and that his or her actions would lead to infringement.222 
Importantly, in order for the patent holder to prevail, she must show that the 
allegedly infringing article or commodity is unsuited for any commercial 
non-infringing use.223 The sale of a product or device capable of both an 
infringing use and other lawful uses is not sufficient for a finding of 
contributory infringement.224 
Copyright law takes a slightly different approach and more closely 
resembles the viewpoint espoused by Commissioner Quintenz. In the realm 
of copyright, one who knowingly induces, causes, or materially contributes 
to copyright infringement by another, but who has not committed or 
participated in the infringing acts him or herself, may be held liable as a 
contributory infringer if he or she had knowledge, or reason to know, of the 
infringement.225 
In a leading copyright case brought by twenty-eight of America’s largest 
entertainment companies, the Supreme Court held that the distributors of a 
free software, which allowed computer users to share electronic files 
through peer-to-peer networks, could be liable for contributory 
infringement, regardless of the software’s lawful uses, based on evidence 
that the software was distributed with the principal, if not exclusive, object 
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of promoting its use to enable copyright infringement.226 The inducement 
rule, as defined by the Court, premises liability on purposeful, culpable 
expression and conduct, and thus protects innovation and commerce with 
lawful potential.227 Justice David Souter, in his unanimous opinion, was 
“mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or 
discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful 
potential,” and the Court confirmed that mere knowledge of either the 
possibility of infringement or of actual infringing uses is not enough to 
subject a distributor to liability.228 
2. Considering DLT Prediction Market Developer Liability Under a 
Likelihood of Infringing Use Model 
Following intellectual property precedent, an indispensable element of 
finding a party secondarily liable is that she knew or should have known 
about the transgressing behavior. The CFTC can claim that DLT prediction 
market code developers should have known of the high potential for 
infringing use, because prediction markets are only currently permissible 
when they conform to certain strict provisions.229 Developers can respond 
that the code was also suited for lawful purposes and liability should 
therefore hinge on intent. 
Adopting the logic of Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., DLT prediction market 
developers would only incur secondary liability where they promote illegal 
conduct. It stands to reason that where developers profit off of the operation 
of markets using their protocol, they have financial motive to encourage 
market participation.230 When developers are rewarded through use-fees, 
and proceed to support trading on illegal markets, profits are being realized 
from illicit activity.231 Any entity that becomes enriched through the 
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unlawful acts of others should face regulatory scrutiny. 
Commissioner Quintenz conjured a hypothetical in which the developers 
of DLT code underlying illicit event contracts could be prosecuted if the 
code were specifically designed to enable the type of activity regulated by 
the CFTC and no effort was made to preclude its availability to U.S. 
persons.232 To illustrate why he believes that DLT developers of blockchain 
prediction market code may reasonably be held liable, Commissioner 
Quintenz used the following metaphor: 
 Think of someone asking you to borrow the keys to your car 
because they want to rob a bank. If you let them borrow your car, it 
would be reasonable for the government to hold you partially 
responsible for the ensuing criminal activity. However, it would be 
unreasonable for the government to prosecute the car 
manufacturer.233 
In essence, Commissioner Quintenz is saying that, because prediction 
markets are under the CFTC’s purview, DLT prediction market code 
developers need to either devise mechanisms which enable censorship of 
market activity or make efforts to preclude American use. Understanding 
that the ability to censor markets undermines the purpose of a decentralized 
system, the policy question at hand is whether it is desirable to compel DLT 
prediction market developers to deter American users.234 
Prediction markets have the potential to provide substantial 
informational and hedging value, but they also create the potential for abuse: 
are DLT prediction market developers more like car-lending bank-robbing 
enablers or more like vehicle manufacturers? Under both patent and 
copyright law principles, only those developers who actively encourage 
illicit use should be held secondarily liable.235 
It is important to distinguish nonprofit entities like the FF from profit-
seeking entities. In contrast to developers who profit from the operation of 
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illicit markets, developers who yield no operational profit are far less 
theoretically culpable because they derive no gain from the unlawful use. If 
an entity lacks both profit incentive and operational control, that entity 
should only potentially be found liable in instances where it takes 
affirmative steps to promote trading in markets it knows to be illegal. As a 
rule, developers who release free software should be applauded for their 
contribution to computing progress and for affording users the freedom to 
share, study, utilize, and transform valuable source-code. 
Enforcing CFTC regulations against DLT prediction market developers 
will do nothing to immediately hinder illegal market activity, as users of the 
code do not require ongoing developer support.236 While secondary liability 
is helpful as a practical alternative to prosecuting all direct infringers,237 and 
while DLT properties such as anonymization and global access make it a 
particularly challenging medium on which to target individual users,238 
pursuing software developers could drastically limit the development of 
beneficial technologies.239 
This point has been clearly articulated in the context of peer-to-peer 
networks and music piracy: 
[I]f the courts declare [peer-to-peer] networks illegal altogether (or 
indirectly do so by ordering modifications . . . ), the social cost will 
not only be the foregone legal uses of those networks at the time they 
are enjoined but also the unanticipated future benefits those networks 
could have brought. Economic evidence strongly suggests that those 
unanticipated future benefits, or “spillover” effects, often exceed the 
immediate value of most new technologies.240 
In order to minimize spillover effects, enforcement should solely be focused 
on culpable actors—in copyright this is the pirating parties, in prediction 
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Prediction markets have experienced waves of interest from users and 
regulators alike, but coupled with DLT, these markets are now poised to 
facilitate seamless and global market participation. Rather than stifle this 
innovation, American regulators have an opportunity to be more permissive 
for both practical and theoretical purposes. Commissioner Quintenz 
declared that he would welcome feedback and discussion related to his 
conception of DLT prediction market liability. This Note answers that call. 
By presenting the economic justification for and excitement behind 
prediction markets, exploring the categories of markets which deserve the 
bulk of regulatory attention, and proposing how to address secondary 
liability in the DLT prediction market context, this Note hopes to 
demonstrate that, in general, pursuing DLT prediction market developers is 
a misguided approach. Instead, the CFTC should exempt code developers 
from liability in their capacity as developers and issue guidelines detailing 
best practices for both non-profit and for-profit entities involved in 
promoting DLT prediction markets. 
In comparing code developers of DLT prediction markets to individuals 
knowingly lending their car to aid and abet a bank robber, Commissioner 
Quintenz misstates the role that these developers play. Developers are more 
akin to the car manufacturer, and just as cars combine the power of many 
horses into a single engine, prediction markets combine the power of many 
minds into a single predictive metric. If the CFTC takes a measured 
approach towards DLT prediction market regulation, these markets can 
drive efficiency gains in every sector of the American economy. 
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